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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-THE "LOCALITY
RULE" AND THE "CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE"*
Until recently, it has been extremely difficult for a plaintiff
to prove medical malpractice because: (1) a medical practitioner's performance was measured against a local community
standard as opposed to a minimum national standard and (2)
doctors would not testify against their professional brothers.
The decisions which established the local community standard
rule are rapidly being undermined, but the second obstacle, the
so-called "conspiracy of silence," is still quite viable.
I. INTRODUCTION

Medicine is of all the Arts most noble; but, owing to
the ignorance of those who practice it, and of those who,
inconsiderately, form a judgment of them, it is at present far behind all the other arts. Their mistake appears
to me to arise principally from this, that in the cities
there is no punishment connected with the practice of
medicine (and with it alone) except disgrace, and that
does not hurt those who are familiar with it. Such persons are like the figures introduced in tragedies, for as
they have the shape, and dress, and personal appearance
of an actor, but are not actors, so also physicians are
many in title but very few in reality.'
]lippocrates' 2 observations concerning the legal aspects of
medical practice are quite interesting, especially when one realizes that much of this 2400 year old statement is true today. An
investigation of recent decisions further reveals that there has
been much litigation involving medical practitioners. As students of the legal profession, we are often called upon to represent a patient or an allegedly incompetent physician who does
not possess the expertise necessary to provide the aggrieved with
the nebulous "minimum standard of care." The bench and bar
face the myriad interpretations and rules incident to this pro* Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E2d 793 (1968).
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fessional standard. This article deals with two policies which
cloud the definition of a "minimum standard of care," that is,
the "locality rule" and its ubiquitous companion, the "conspiracy of silence." To further complicate matters, each policy
contains numerous refinements and interpretations-all covertly
couched under these two shibboleths.
In the 1968 case, Brmne v. Belinkoff,3 the same court which
had originally enunciated the "locality rule" in 1880 renounced
it. Based on this leading case, the "locality rule" appears destined for a restful peace among numerous other legal skeletons.
Its demise, however, has been hindered by (1) long factually
irrelevant bibliographies of cases which the courts are reluctant
to overrule because of reverence for the doctrine of stare decisis;
(2) defense attorneys who have a "ready-made defense" if they
can utilize the "locality rule," which makes it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to prove his allegation of malpractice; (3)
an organized medical profession which seeks to eliminate malpractice litigation; (4) malpractice insurance carriers who seem
more concerned with their balance sheets than with either the
plaintiff's or the defendant physioian's welfare; and (5) the
individual doctors themselves, who, as members of a closely knit
professional fraternity, are reluctant to testify against their
professional brothers. Notwithstanding these formidable obstacles, the "locality rule" is becoming less viable, and the foundations supporting the "conspiracy of silence" are beginning to
crack.

IL Tm LocAiTY Rui
A. An Historical View: The Rise and FaZZ of the Loca ity Rule
In 1853, a Pennsylvania court in MoCandless 'v. JcTVha4 defined what is generally thought to have been the minimum
standard of care for medical practitioners at that time. The
court said:
The law has no allowance for quackery. It demands
gualificationin the profession practised-not extraordinary skill such as belongs only to few men of rare
genius and endowments, but that degree which ordinarily characterizes the profession.5
The court also stated that a physician should employ "reasonable skill and diligence as are ordinarily exercised in his pro3. 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
4. 22 Penn. St 261 (1853).
5. Id. at 269.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss5/6

2

Armstrong: Medical
Malpractice--The
"Locality Rule" and the "Conspiracy
[Vol. 22 of S
SouTH
CAROLINA LAW
REviEw

fession. " The importance of these statements is that there is no
mention of, or allusion to, the physician's locality.
In Sm'whers v. Hanks,7 the dissenting judge felt that the
McCandless statement 8 was just and further indicated that the
frontier village surgeon should be brought to the side of his
professional city brother because, "[i]n this age [1872] of books,
professional periodicals, and mails .

.

..

[wie may safely say

that no respectable surgeon, wherever he may be, is uninformed
of the progress and discoveries in his profession." 9 But the
Smotlers majority said that the "whole case [MHCandless] . . .
is . ..

remarkable .

.

. and their [MoCandless] observations are

0
well calculated to mislead."'
Smothers was one of the earlier cases in the development of
the "locality rule," but the rule was also in the fetal stage in
Kansas" and Vermont. 1 2 Its birthplace, however, is considered
to have been in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court stated
the rule in SmaZl v. Howard'3 :
The defendant [country surgeon], undertaking to
practise as a physician and surgeon in a town of comparatively small population [2500], was bound to possess that skill only which physicians and surgeons of
ordinary ability and skill, practicing in similar localities, with opportunities for no larger experience, ordinarily possess; and he was not bound to possess that
high degree of art and skill possessed by eminent surgeons practicing in large cities, and making a specialty
of the practice of surgery.' 4

The court, in maintaining its very narrow view posited on specific facts, continued that the country surgeon would have "but
few opportunities of observation and practice ... such as pub6. Id. at 267. This was essentially the standard of care in Illinois in 1860
when Abraham Lincoln represented a defendant physician. Lincoln lost the
case, both at trial and on appeal. See Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 329, 330 (1860).

7. 34 Iowa 286 (1872).

8. McCandless v. McWha, 22 Penn. St. 261, 269 (1853).

9. Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286, 299 (1872).

10. Id. at 293-94. It is interesting that the Iowa court should make such an
observation, since it got thoroughly mired in semantics while trying to differentiate between doctors of ordinary skill, those with average skill, those

thoroughly educated, etc. In undermining McCandless, they mustered weak
support from Howard v. Grover, 28 Me. 97 (1848), inter alia.
11. Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870).
12. Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt. 557 (1876).
13. 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880).
14. Id. at 132.
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lie hospitals or large cities would afford."1 5 Even though the
stated rule was quite narrow, most courts seemed to adopt it or
at least some variation of it. 16 It was applied to all types of
medical practitioners, including a Chinese herb doctor "who
[held] himself out as a physician or surgeon, whether licensed
or not . .. .17
The strict narrowness of the rule as enunciated caused it to
come under attack quite early. A 1916 Minnesota court refused
to apply the rule because "[flrequent meetings of medical societies, articles in medical journals, books by acknowledged authorities and extensive experience in hospital work put the country
doctor on more equal terms with his city brother."18 The rule
ran into further difficulty in Michigan where the court
acknowledged that, if the defendant were the only practitioner
in the town, "it would be impossible to secure [expert medical]
testimony at all." 19 Connecticut broadened the original rule as
stated in SmalZ by refusing to restrict the rule's territorial limitations to the confines of a city or town.20 A forward looking
North Dakota court said the standard should be "measured by
conditions as they exist, and not by what they have been in the
past or may be in the future." 21 And a 1956 Rhode Island court,
in recognizing the scarcity of expert specialists, broadened the
rule and allowed a Philadelphian to testify as to the Providence
standard for "mastoidectomies [that] are performed by otolo-

gists ....))22
In 1965 the American Law Institute, in recognition of a more
mobile and metropolitan society, adopted the even more liberal
standard "of persons engaged in similar practice in similar
localities, considering geographical location, size, and the character of the community in general." 23 But the fatal blow was
15. Id. at 136, 35 Am. Rep. at 365. See also 31

JATLI

L.J. 133 (1968).

16. See generally 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 42, 43 (1951) and 41

Am. JuR. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 86,87 (1942).

17. Hanson v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 P. 282 (1920).

18. Viita v. Dolan, 132 Minn. 128, 135-37, 155 N.W. 1077, 1081, 1916D
L.R.A. 644. This statement immediately reminds one of the dissent in Smiothers
v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286, 299 (1872). See text at note 9 supra.
19. Sampson v. Veenboer, 252 Mich. 660, 667, 234 N.W. 170, 172 (1931).
20. Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 573-74, 162 A. 33, 36 (1932).
21. Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 349, 294 N.W. 183, 188 (1940), 132
A.L.R. 379, 386 (1941).

22. Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67, 72, 121 A2d 669, 672 (1956).
23. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 299A, comment g (1965). See also
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOx OF THE LAW OF TORTS 166-67 (3d ed. 1964).
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struck by the Massachusetts court in Brune v. Belinkoff2 4 where

25
"[t]he rule was abrogated by the court which promulgated it."1

B. The Rule Today
In overruling SmaZl 2 6 the Brune27 court completely reversed
the Small court by saying:
[T]he medical profession should no longer be Balkanvarying geographic standards in malized by ...
practice cases ....

The proper standard is whether the physician, if a
general practitioner, has exercised the degree of care
and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking
2
into account the advances in the profession.

Needless to say, Brune and the factually similar case of Pederson v. Dumouahe, 20 a 1967 Washington case, have been the
source of much commentary. Perhaps the best critique of the two
cases was made by Professor Waltz" ° when he said:
Brune suggests a nationwide standard for both specialists and general practitioners

. .

. Pederso?01 is

more cautious [as it only holds] the medical man to that
degree of care and skill established in areas accessible
to him ....

32

Recognizing the two major problems caused by the locality rule
the shallow pool of available expertise from which a
-()
plaintiff can draw a witness, and (2) the fact that the mini24. 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
25. Avey v. St. Francis Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc., 201 Kan. 687,
696, 442 P.2d 1013, 1020 (1968).
26. Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363 (1880).
27. Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E2d 793 (1968). See Waltz,
The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule it Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DFPAUL L. R.EV. 408 (1969); Note, Standard of Care for Medical
Practitioners-TheLocality Rule, 14 S.D.L. REv. 349 (1969); Comment, A
Review of the Locality Rule, 1969 U. Iii.L.F. 96 (1969). Cf. 20 S.C.L. Ryv.
872 (1968) and 82 HAav.L. Ry. 1781 (1969).
28. 354 Mass. at 108, 235 N.E.2d at 798. See also Tr AL, Aug.-Sept., 1969 at
48.
29. 72 Wash. 2d 73, 79, 431 P2d 973, 978 (1967). "The 'locality rule' has no
it may" be considered as one of the elements
that ...
except
present-day vitality
of care
to determine the degree
The court also "note[d] that the law of this jurisdiction has never recognized a difference in the professional competency of a lawyer in a small community from that of the professional competency required of a lawyer in a
large city." Id. at 77, 431 P.2d at 977.
30. Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAuL L. REv. 408 (1969).
31. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P2d 973 (1967).
32. Waltz, supra note 30, at 418.
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mally proficient practitioners have been allowed by default to
set community standards--Professor Waltz speculates that "Itihe
locality rule will pass unlamented by all but a handful of lawyers and a few substandard medical practitioners." 33 Whether
or not the prognosis will prove accurate is moot; however, several courts have already mitigated the harshness of the "locality
often ingenious means, 34 and several have adopted
rule" by
3
B,,,e. r3

As opposed to the general practitioner, the standard of skill
required of specialists has been less dependent on the specialist's
3
locality, 30 and more dependent on the "state of the art." 7 The
reason is patently obvious. A community may have several general practitioners; therefore, it is at least arguable that a community standard does in fact exist. But specialists are usually
located either in the larger metropolitan areas or in defined
geographic regions. Thus, to talk in terms of a community
33. Id. at 420.
34. See generally 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 42, 43 (1951) and 41
Am. Ju. Physician and Surgeons § 86, 87 (1942). For a state tally of the
locality rule as of 1969, see Alexander, The Standard of Care, MEtiCAL &
DENTAL MAuRAcricE 9 (I. Cohen ed. 1969).
35. See, e.g., Avey v. St. Francis Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc., 201
Kan. 687, 442 P2d 1013 (1968) ; King v. Flamm, 442 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1969),
rezfg 434 S.W2d 197 (Tex. 1968). For the latest statement of Texas law, see
Christian v. Jeter, 445 S.W2d 51 (Tex. 1969), which quotes 8 A.L.R.2d 773
(1949).
Brune was decided by the Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court on April 3,
1968. But the "locality rule" question was also under discussion in the federal
courts of Massachusetts. Alexandridis v. Jewett, 388 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1968),
which was decided on January 24, 1968, presents a tragic fact situation. During
parturition, the defendant physician performed an episiotomy (incision) in the
perineum to allow more room for delivery. The anal sphincter subsequently
ruptured, and the defendant attempted repair. The original incision (which
was totally unnecessary according to expert testimony) and the attempted
repair became infected when the sutures parted. Two subsequent operations to
correct the plaintiff's condition also failed, and she has since been left with
chronic rectal incontinence.
The court, which granted the plaintiff a new trial, avoided the "locality rule"
by saying that the plaintiff had contracted for the care of two specialists and
instead she received the service of a first-year obstetric resident. Therefore,
the care provided for was less than that contracted for.
A federal court in Colorado was apparently unable to find a way to bypass
the state "locality rule" when it reluctantly followed the doctrine as set forth
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Colorado court, in
citing Brune said, "Certainly the similar locality test has been subjected to
persuasive, scholarly criticism and has recently been rejected .... But in the
diversity suit we are, of course, bound by the Colorado rule." Murphy v. Dyer,
409 F.2d 747, 749 (D. Colo. 1969).
One cannot help but question the merits of Erie when viewed in light of
Murphy, supra. When faced with an unclear rule or an "antiquated" rule, one
can readily see the merits of choosing the state forum when litigating such
a question.
36. See generally 21 A.L.R.3d 953 (1968).
37. E.g., Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.I. 67, 121 A2d 669 (1956).
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standard is absurd. The best standard for the specialist is perhaps regional or hopefully national. Several courts have specifically abandoned the "locality rule" as applied to specialists. 3 8
C. The Locality Rule in Soutb Carolina
South Carolina has had relatively few malpractice cases, and
of these cases fewer yet involving the "locality rule."3 9 The
latest statement by the South Carolina Supreme Court was in
Bessinger v. DeLoaoh.40 The case involved a dentist whose competence was questionable. In stating the standard, the court said
that the dentist is
only bound to possess and exercise that degree of skill
and learning which is ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of his profession in good standing in
the same general neighborhood or in similar localities.
Failure to perform his duty in either of these respects
41
is malpractice.
As is often the case, a rule stated in one forum is interpreted
by another. In Kapuschinsky v. United States42 the Federal
District Court for South Carolina said:
From South Carolina authority [Bessinger] it can be
inferred that at least the "community" standard [for
hospitals] would obtain .... [lilt would seem that the
"community" is not necessarily restricted to the geographical area in proximity to the alleged tortfeasor,
but would extend to other locales similarly situated. 43
The court substantiated its conclusion by citing ,a ninth circuit
opinion which held that "'the essential factor is knowledge of
similarity of conditions; geographical proximity is only one
factor to be considered.''

44

The Federal District Court for

38. Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A2d 680 (1953); Hundley v.
Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E2d 159 (1967).
39. The practitioner's biggest problem in relation to the "locality rule" is
keeping abreast of the latest developments and techniques. A physician in a

rural community does not have the same degree of exposure as the physician
fortunate enough to be associated with a clinic or hospital in a technically
progressive area. It is interesting to note that the South Carolina branch of the
American College of Surgeons' Committee on Trauma is presently trying to
alleviate the problem by coordinating a training program for rural practicing
physicians. See, Aid to the Injured: The South Carolina Concept, JOURNAL OF
Am ricAN INSURANCE, May-June 1970, at 2.

40. 230 S.C. 1, 94 S.E2d 3 (1956).
41. Id. at 7, 94 S.E2d at 6.

42. 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1966).
43. Id. at 743.

44. United States v. Canon, 217 F.2d 70, 73 (9th Cir. 1954).
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South Carolina continued: "The argument for application of a
'national standard' has efficacy here because [the Naval Hospital] was accredited by the Joint Commission of Accreditation
of Hospitals."45 At least one commentator" seems to believe
that, via Kapusckinsky, South Carolina has enunciated and follows a minimum national standard for doctors similar to that
47
suggested in Brune.
The South Carolina position, however, is at best confused. The
latest interpretation of South Carolina's position came in Steeves
v. United States, 4 where Judge Hemphill essentially reiterated
his Kapuschinsky views. He held that a practitioner must "only
possess and exercise that degree of skill and learning which is
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of his profession
who are in good standing and live in a general neighborhood or
in a similar locality." 49
Although Kapuschinsky leaves little doubt that the "hospital
locality rule" has virtually no place within the federal courts in
South Carolina, a valid question remains as to what degree the
"locality rule" has been abrogated in the South Carolina state
courts. The variations of the rule stated in Bessinger are not as
clear, nor as broad, as stated in Kapusehinsky. But neither is
the rule as stated in Bessinger as narrow as that in Smaf. Perhaps when appropriate facts present themselves, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina will make a clearer statement of what
the South Carolina position is.

III. Tnn

"CoNsPRmAcY

oF SILENOc"

While the "locality rule" precludes numerous suits, the "conspiracy of silence" terminates a far greater number because it
makes it extremely difficult for the plaintiff to acquire the
expert testimony necessary to carry his burden of proof. Such a
''conspiracy" is kept active by formal and informal medical
associations. But perhaps the biggest "conspiracy" supporter is
the malpractice insurance carrier which Melvin M. Belli affectionately refers to as the "Mount Everest Holy Grail Insurance
45. Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732, 744 (D.S.C. 1966).
See Note, Non-Resident Expert Testimony on Local Hospital Standards, 18
Crv. ST. L. REv. 493, 501 (1969).
46. Alexander, The Standard of Care, MEDICAL & DENTAL MALPRACTICE 9,
14 (I. Cohen ed. 1969).
47. Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968).
48. 294 F. Supp. 446 (D.S.C. 1968).
49. Id. at 453.
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Company, Inc., of Nebraska or whatever." 50 He states that the
"physician's pride in his profession has been transcended by his
sense of duty to the . . ."51 insurance company which "wield[s]

52
the whip that keeps medical men silent and in line."
A cursory investigation of legal history shows how medical
insurance carriers came into existence and explains their relative
popularity. "'The oldest code of laws in the world' of which we
are aware, promulgated by Hammurabi, King of Babylon
B.C. 2285-2242" established liability for the malpractitioner.5 3
Alexander went a bit further and "condemned the doctor to
death for breach of professional duty."5 4 Needless to say, the
doctors sought to mitigate the consequences of malpractice, so
inter alia the "locality rule" was devised along with malpractice
insurance and silence outside of the medical fraternity.5 5 In
Kapuschinsky, the court said:
The Court recognizes the difficulty plaintiff had in obtaining local specialists to testify. Judicial notice will
be taken of the well recognized reluctance of members
of the medical profession to testify in cases of this

50. Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment,

1 VILL. L. REv. 250, 257 (1956).
51. Id.

52. Id. at 253.
53. Perhaps the lawyer's most accessible source of relevant segments of the
Hammurabic Code is in Hughes v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 162 Ga.
246, 262, 134 S.E. 42, 49 (1926). A typical clause is: "If a doctor has treated
a gentlemen for a severe wound with a lancet of bronze and has caused the
gentleman to die, or has opened an abscess of the eye for a gentleman with the
bronze lancet and has caused the loss of the gentleman's eye, one shall cut off
his hands."

54. 3 M.

BELLI, IODERN TRIALS

1975 (1954). For an excellent discussion on

suing a doctor for malpractice, the history of medical responsibilities, and
quantum of care required, see respectively 3 M. BELLI, MODERN TRIAIs §§ 327,
328, 329 (1954).
55. Consider Justice Carter's interesting and often quoted dissent in Huffman
v. Lidquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 484, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (1951).
Anyone familiar with cases of this character knows that the socalled ethical practitioner will not testify on behalf of a plaintiff
regardless of the merits of his case. This is largely due to the pressure exerted by medical societies and public liability insurance
companies which issue policies of liability insurance to physicians
covering malpractice claims. While court records show that some of
these claims may be questionable, many have substantial merit and
ethical considerations are generally with the plaintiff's side of the
case. But regardless of the merits of the plaintiff's case, physicians
who are members of medical societies flock to the defense of their
fellow member charged with malpractice and the plaintiff is relegated, for his expert testimony, to the occasional lone wolf or
heroic soul, who for the sake of truth and justice has the courage
to run the risk of ostracism by his fellow practitioners and the
cancellation of his public liability insurance policy.
See also 31 JATLy L.J. 128 (1968).
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style . . . Some plaintiffs' lawyers call this a "conspiracy of silence," though that characterization seems
a bit strong. 56
Whether the characterization is strong or weak is somewhat
academic. The fact remains that citizens, who seek legal redress
against an alleged malpractitioner, are seriously hampered by
the physicians' individual and collective actions and the actions
of their insurance carriers. One can plausibly argue that such
actions effectively take the administration of justice out of the
judicial organs, as they deny a plaintiff his constitutionally
quaranteed right of a trial by jury57
The question is how does the plaintiff's attorney fight this
"conspiracy." Since practitioners cannot be forced to testify
against their fellow practitioners, several techniques have been
developed. One, which is not particularly popular, is the implied
contractual obligation and its consequential breach.5 8 Here, the
lawyer must prove a contract from complex facts and then show
that the contract was breached. This in itself will cause all but
the most proficient lawyers to turn to tort actions, but another
major reason for avoiding an action for breach of contract is
that damages have been historically limited to real damages.
The two most popular tort theories in malpractice litigation
are: (1) res ipsa loquitur and (2) battery. The advantage of
both of these legal theories is that the plaintiff does not have
to produce an expert practitioner to prove his case. However,
their application is limited to "some medical and surgical errors
on which any layman is competent to pass judgment and con56. Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732, 744 n.15 (D.S.C. 1966).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VII, as construed in Capital Traction v. Hof, 174

U.S. 1, 23 (1899). See also TRLaL, Feb.-Mar. 1970 at 18. Much attention has
been devoted to the medical profession and its various legal problems as related
to the "conspiracy of silence." A partial bibliography of relevant topics is
herein included: Wasmuth, The Conspiracy of Silence: Physician's View 15
CLEV.-MAR. L. Ray. 85 (1966); Trout, Medical Witness" Treatment by Courts,
17 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 213 (1968); Franklin, What Should Be in a Malpractice Insurance Policy, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 478 (1965); Note, The Physician as a Witness, 16 Cxv.-AMW. L. Rav. 494 (19-67); Belli, An Ancient
Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REV. 250
(1956). See also Currin, A Symposium of Professional Negligence, 12 VAND.

L. Ray. 535 et seq. (1959). In particular see Hirsh, Insuring Against Medical
ProfessionalLiability, 12 VAN. L. Rav. 667 (1959). South Carolinians should
be particularly interested in: George Savage King, Liability for Negligence of
Pharmacists, 12 VAND. L. REv. 695 (1959). See also Note, Malpractice and
Medical Testimony, 77 HAIhv. L. REv. 333 (1964).
58. See Alexandridis v. Jewett, 388 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1968), which is discussed in note 35, supra.
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elude from common experience that such things do not happen
if there has been proper skill and care. ' 5 9
South Carolina, though it purports to reject res ipsa loquitur
by name, nevertheless accepts it in fact. 60 To prove injury by
res ipsa loquitur, three elements must be proven:
(1) [T]he event must be of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;

(2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive control of the defendant; [and]
(3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.61
The other tort action which is often employed is battery. Battery in malpractice suits can be summarized by saying:
Every individual has a right to the inviolability of his
person which forbids a surgeon or physician to invade
the bodily integrity of his person. Whenever a surgeon
or physician, 'without the patient's permission, performs
an operation or renders medical treatment, he prima
facie commits a battery. 62
Res ipsa. loquitur and battery are nothing more than tort
theories, which may be employed to enable a plaintiff to avoid
producing an expert witness. Unless the plaintiff is able to
employ one of these strategies, he is compelled to produce a
medical expert who can carry his burden of proof. Should he be
unable to get an expert, the plaintiff is virtually precluded from
recovery.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In addition to the various attacks that are being directed at

the "locality rule" by the legal profession, it is interesting to
note that it is also under attack by the medical profession.6 3
59. W. Paossmi,

HANDBOOK OF THE

LAW

OF

TORTS 231 (3d ed. 1964).
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COMMENTS

Perhaps the rule's lack of popularity stems from social changes
which have changed our society from a largely agrarian one
posited on provincial ideals, to one which is relatively welleducated, highly mobile, and rather cosmopolitan.
Similarly, the "conspiracy of silence" is being attacked by
both the legal and medical communities. But the "conspiracy"
has not been mitigated to the extent that the "locality rule" has
been. Based on the imminent changes our society will experience,
it necessarily follows that the bench and the bar will respond by
seeking to overrule the highly technical rules which have little
justification in today's social structure.
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